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Let me start off by saying that before the Sentencing Reform Act took 
effect nearly half of all offenders sentenced had their punishment determined 
by a guideline system that took into account their criminal history and the 
severity of the offense.  It was a grid that is similar to, but not as complex as, 
the grid in the back of the Sentencing Guidelines book.  That grid was 
administered by the United States Parole Commission.  The effect of the 
Sentencing Reform Act was to move the guideline decision from the end of the 
punishment process to the beginning of the punishment process.  There were 
consequences that flowed from that change and Judge Heaney has pointed out 
some of those consequences.  There has been a shift in the relative power, for 
some of the participants in the system.1 
The Sentencing Reform Act was a delegation to the Sentencing 
Commission by Congress of congressional power over sentencing.  Congress 
could enact guidelines, but I think that Congress wanted to distance itself from 
the process.  For one thing, most members of Congress do not view themselves 
as being elected to sit down and go through pre-sentence reports to determine 
what sort of factors ought to go into imposing sentence.  They want to focus on 
broad public policy issues.  The Sentencing Committee was to be a body of 
experts who would fine tune and craft guidelines that were detailed and that 
were intellectually honest and consistent—tasks that Congress, itself, did not 
want to undertake. 
Unfortunately, almost after enacting the Guidelines system, Congress 
made the task of the Commission more difficult by enacting mandatory 
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minimums.  That presented the Commission with some questions.  In the drug 
area, where mandatory minimums are based on quantity?  If the Commission is 
going to have a drug guideline for trafficking offenses that is based on 
quantity, does the Commission ignore entirely the Congressional views of 
severity as expressed in the mandatory minimums and craft guidelines that it 
thinks appropriate and let the mandatory minimums override the Guidelines if 
the Commission’s view of severity does not coincide with Congress’s view?  
Or does the Commission take the Congressional numbers and work them into 
the Guidelines?  The consequences of the latter might be much higher 
sentences than the Sentencing Commission, left to its own devices, might have 
come up with. 
Congress, over the years, not only proposed and frequently enacted 
mandatory minimums, but also has started to enact directives of varying sorts 
for the Commission.  Some of the directives were general, for example, to 
consider certain factors.  Some of them were far more particular, for example, 
to enhance by a certain number of levels for certain kinds of conduct.  I think 
that Professor Goldsmith has correctly stated that one of the serious problems 
confronting the new Commission is its relationship with Congress.2 
The relationship between the Commission and Congress is a two-way 
street.  The leadership of both parties in both Houses has to be educated about 
how the Guidelines work and what the Commission is seeking to accomplish.  
And the leadership, on both sides of the isle, in both Houses, has to be 
responsible and restrain some of the more hot-headed members of the body 
from enacting laws that are not sound public policy. 
I think that Commissioner Goldsmith is correct that the crack episode 
damaged the Commission’s credibility with the Hill and that relationship is 
going to have to be repaired. 
I do not share Professor Goldsmith’s view, however, of how judges made 
sentencing decisions before the Guidelines came into effect.  I do not think the 
freakish way that he described was typical.  In fact, I think, it was just the 
opposite. 
Judges were thoughtful in their imposition of sentences.  But, I think it also 
undeniable, and certainly Congress found it undeniable, that the result of 
having – at  the time the Sentencing Reform Act was passed and enacted into 
law – over 500 independent decision-makers led to what Judge Heaney has 
called “inter-judge disparity.”3  Congress was interested in eliminating that 
disparity but not in eliminating discretion entirely.  Congress wanted to leave 
some room for discretion, and the issue is how much room has been left.  I 
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think the early Commission was perceived as wanting to discourage 
departures.  Every time a court would depart, it seemed, there would be a 
proposed amendment addressing that departure ground and saying it was no 
longer a basis for departure. 
If the new Commission wants to encourage judicial discretion and to give 
greater room for judges to exercise judgment (as Judge Heaney points out, 
judges are appointed for lifetime and given a great deal of power), the 
Commission ought to be encouraged. 
I was not encouraged to hear Mr. McCloskey’s description of prosecutorial 
discretion when he said his office rarely deviates from the strictures of the 
Guidelines.4  To me that is not the exercise of discretion; that is the antithesis 
of discretion.  To say that there is no gun case that could ever arise in his 
district that would not be something that you would plea bargain over means, 
to me, that you are not exercising discretion, but you are declining to exercise 
discretion. 
My bottom line is that the Commission’s first task is to repair its relations 
with Congress so that Congress can be educated into more constructive modes 
of legislating in the crime area rather than in some of the directions it has gone 
in the past. 
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